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Abstract 
 
 This study investigates the effects of attentional control on the hemispheric 
processing of predictive inferences during reading. Participants read texts that were either 
strongly or weakly constrained towards a predictive inference and performed a lexical 
decision task to inference-related target words presented to the right or left visual field—
hemisphere. Facilitation for strongly constrained predictive inferences was greater than 
facilitation for weakly constrained predictive inferences in both hemispheres. Readers 
with high attentional control showed significant facilitation for strongly constrained 
inferences in the both hemispheres, but only showed significant facilitation for weakly 
constrained inferences in the left hemisphere. Readers with low attentional control did 
not show significant facilitation in any of the conditions. These results suggest that 
readers with high attentional control may have an advantage for generating predictive 
inferences during reading, a skill which could contribute to improved situation model 
construction and comprehension compared to readers with low attentional control.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Successful reading comprehension relies on the ability to generate connections 
(i.e., inferences) about information presented in a text. Previous research has shown that 
certain types of inferences (e.g., coherence or bridging inferences) are necessary for 
understanding a text as they establish connections between what the reader is currently 
processing and information that they have encountered previously in a text (Graessar, 
Singer, & Trabasso, 1994). For example, in the passage “The man threw the vase against 
the wall. It cost over $100 to replace,” the reader must refer back to the first sentence to 
understand that the vase broke. By contrast, predictive inferences (i.e., predictions about 
what will occur next in a text) are often considered to be elaborative and optional 
(Allbritton, 2004; Casteel, 2007). For example, after reading the sentence, “The couple 
were just pronounced as man and wife” one will likely make a prediction that the couple 
will kiss, but this prediction may not be necessary to comprehend subsequent information 
in the text. Thus, predictive inferences are not as crucial to text comprehension as 
bridging or coherence inferences.  
Despite being optional during text comprehension, research has shown that 
predictive inferences can help readers build situation models (i.e., mental representations 
of the situations conveyed by words and sentences in a text) (Zwaan, Magliano, & 
Graesser, 1995; Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998) and improve comprehension (Fincher-
Kiefer, 1993). Further, research has shown that predictive inferences can lead to easier 
processing of future texts events (van den Broek, 1990). However, generating predictive 
inferences is costly in terms of cognitive processing and thus requires ample resources in 
working memory (i.e., the ability to store and process information simultaneously), which 
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may not be available to all readers during text comprehension (Baddeley, 1983; 
Linderholm, 2002; Virtue, van den Broek, & Linderholm, 2006). Specifically, research 
has suggested that readers with low working memory capacity (WMC) rarely make 
predictive inferences during reading, which suggests that predictive inferences may only 
be available to readers with access to a certain amount of working memory resources 
(Linderholm, 2002). Thus, working memory contributes to predictive inference 
generation during reading. 
The availability of predictive inferences during reading has also been shown to 
vary based on the level of causal constraint (i.e., the likelihood that future events will take 
place) in a text. Readers are less likely to generate predictive inferences after reading 
weakly constrained texts versus strongly constrained texts (Linderholm, 2002; Virtue, et 
al., 2006). For example, compared to the previous example of the couple being 
pronounced husband and wife (i.e., a strongly constrained text), a reader would be less 
likely to generate the predictive inference that the two characters would kiss if they had 
been presented with the sentence “The students had just been announced as college 
graduates” (i.e., a weakly constrained text) (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum, causal constraint 
can influence the likelihood that a reader will generate a predictive inference during 
reading. 
The neural mechanisms that underlie predictive inference generation have also 
been shown to vary based on textual constraint and working memory capacity. 
Specifically, high working memory capacity readers have been shown to exhibit greater 
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than weakly constrained inferences in both 
hemispheres while low working memory capacity readers show the same pattern in the 
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left hemisphere but show higher facilitation for weakly constrained inferences than for 
strongly constrained inferences in the right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). These 
findings suggest that readers with low working memory capacity are less likely to inhibit 
weakly constrained predictions in the right hemisphere than readers with high working 
memory capacity.  
Recent research has identified attentional control (i.e., the ability to fixate 
attention on a task and resist interference from task-irrelevant stimuli) as a crucial 
element of working memory (Unsworth & Spillers, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2012). 
Attentional control—which can be measured using a go/no-go task called the Sustained 
Attention to Response Task (SART)—influences goal-maintenance processes (i.e., 
processes that guide attention toward task-relevant information) during reading by 
facilitating access to information in a text while minimizing interference from 
distractions (e.g., environmental interference, habitual behaviors, task irrelevant 
thoughts) (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007; McVay & Kane, 2012). While research has 
provided insights into influence of WMC on predictive inference generation, research has 
yet to investigate the specific role that attentional control could play in this process. 
Investigating this topic can provide a better understanding of the attention-specific 
mechanisms that underlie previously observed differences in predictive inference 
generation as a factor of WMC. Specifically, comparing findings from investigations of 
WMC and predictive inference generation with findings from an investigation of 
attentional control and predictive inference generation could provide insight into the 
specific influence that attentional control has on a reader’s ability to make predictions 
about what will occur next in a text. Thus, the present study investigates how attentional 
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control affects predictive inference generation in the hemispheres during reading as a 
function of textual constraint.  
The following sections provide a theoretical overview for the present study, 
including a discussion of predictive inferences and a review of previous research on 
hemispheric processing of predictive inferences. This is followed by a discussion of 
previous research on the influence of textual constraint and working memory on 
predictive inference generation and a review of relevant research on the effects of 
attentional control on text comprehension in the hemispheres during reading.  
Attributional Research 
Predictive Inferences 
Broadly speaking, inferences can be divided into two primary categories: 
backward inferences and forward inferences (Fincher-Kiefer, 1995; Virtue et al., 2006a). 
Bridging inferences (i.e., backward inferences) allow readers to connect new information 
in a text with information mentioned earlier in a text (van den Broek, 1990; Virtue et al., 
2006a). For example, in the passage, “The man threw the vase against the wall. It cost 
over one hundred dollars to replace,” the second sentence creates a coherence break (i.e., 
an interruption to the logical flow of the narrative) and, thus, a bridging inference is 
necessary to understand that the vase mentioned in the first sentence was broken after it 
was thrown against the wall. Bridging inferences allow readers to combine background 
knowledge (e.g., knowing what happens to fragile objects when they are thrown against 
hard surfaces) with contextual information (e.g., the fact that the vase had to be replaced) 
to resolve contradictions created by coherence breaks and, thus, to understand what is 
occurring in a text (Graessar, Singer, & Trabasso, 1994; Beeman, Bowden, & 
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Gernsbacher, 2000). Thus, backward inferences are necessary for comprehension because 
they allow readers to draw connections between the information that they are currently 
reading and the information that was previously mentioned to create a more detailed 
representation of a text.  
Predictive inferences (i.e., forward inferences) allow readers to anticipate what 
will happen next in a text (van den Broek, 1990). For example, after reading the sentence, 
“The minister just pronounced the couple husband and wife,” it is likely that a reader will 
infer, based on their background knowledge of wedding ceremonies, that the couple will 
kiss (Virtue et al., 2006). According to the Construction-Integration model (Kintsch, 
1988), readers generate inferences by making connections between multiple events and 
ideas in a text and integrating those connections with their background knowledge to 
construct a macro-level representation of a text (i.e., situation model). This model 
suggests that readers automatically activate predictive inferences during reading to 
comprehend a text.  
Some research has provided support for the Construction-Integration model with 
regard to inferences by showing the advantages that predictive inference generation 
provides for text comprehension. For example, predictive inferences can lead to easier 
processing of future text events by allowing readers to anticipate what will happen next 
and proceed more quickly to subsequent text events when those predictions are confirmed 
(van den Broek, 1990). Predictive inferences have also been found to help readers make 
causal connections between events in a text (Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). Specifically, 
predictive inferences have been shown to improve readers’ ability to construct situation 
models of narratives during reading, which leads to improved comprehension of a text 
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(Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). Further, some research has suggested that certain types of 
predictive inferences (e.g., high-predictability inferences) are necessary for text 
comprehension (Klin, Murray, Levine, & Guzman, 1999). Thus, predictive inferences 
may provide important advantages to readers during text comprehension. 
However, research has been inconclusive as to whether or not readers routinely 
and automatically generate predictive inferences during reading (Campion, 2004). The 
Minimalist Hypothesis posits that only locally coherent (i.e., sentence level) inferences, 
which are necessary for comprehension, are routinely activated during text 
comprehension (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). A related theory called the Constructionist 
Theory, posits that globally coherent (i.e., inferences that contribute to a reader’s overall 
understanding of a text) are also activated automatically during reading (Graessar, Singer, 
& Trabasso, 1993). Several studies have provided support for the Minimalist Hypothesis 
and Constructionist Theory with regard to predictive inference generation by showing 
that predictive inferences are not routinely activated during reading, despite being 
available under certain optimal conditions (e.g. when story context strongly supports 
predictive inference generation) (Weingarten, Guzman, Levine, & Klin, 2003; Campion, 
2004; Casteel, 2007). As a result, predictive inferences are often considered to be 
optional and elaborative rather than automatic and critical for comprehension.   
Predictive inferences have also been shown to be cognitively demanding 
(Linderholm, 2002). That is, predicting future text events requires cognitive resources 
that go above and beyond simply encoding and processing current text events. As such, 
predictive inferences tend to be generated more often by readers who score highly on 
measures of reading comprehension (e.g., the Nelson Denny Reading Test) than by 
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readers who score poorly on measures of reading comprehension (Murray & Burke, 
2003). According to the Causal Inference Process model, predictive inference generation 
relies on the interplay between activation of explicitly stated and associated concepts in 
long-term memory being transferred into working memory (van den Broek, 1994). Thus, 
predictive inferences require a minimum amount of activation of inference-related 
concepts to be successfully generated. 
In sum, predictive inferences allow readers to make predictions about future text 
events and have been shown to improve comprehension, but readers do not routinely 
generate predictive inferences during reading. Further, research has shown that predictive 
inferences are cognitively demanding and that the ability to generate predictive 
inferences during reading varies based on reading skill. To better understand the 
processes that underlie predictive inference generation, research has investigated how 
predictive inferences are processed in each hemisphere of the brain. 
Inferential Processing in the Hemispheres  
Research on the hemispheric processing of predictive inferences has provided 
insight into the specific neural mechanisms that underlie inferential processing in the 
brain. Specifically, research has provided support for the right hemisphere’s role in 
inferential processing during reading. Brownell, Potter, Bihrle, & Gardner (1986) found 
that patients with right hemisphere lesions were severely impaired in their ability to draw 
inferences. Specifically, right-hemisphere-damaged patients were unable to successfully 
answer true or false questions about information that was not explicitly mentioned in a 
text (i.e., information requiring a bridging inference) despite being able to correctly 
answer questions about explicitly stated information (Brownell et al., 1986). Subsequent 
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research, which used lexical decision tasks to test inference generation in right 
hemisphere-damaged patients after they read narratives containing multiple passages, 
also found evidence to support the right hemisphere’s role in inferential processing 
(Beeman, 1993). These early investigations suggested that neurological structures in the 
right hemisphere were crucial for inferring information during text processing. 
Subsequent studies have provided a more nuanced understanding of the right 
hemisphere’s role in predictive inference processing. For instance, research on healthy 
participants has indicated that the right hemisphere is more sensitive to priming 
predictive (i.e., forward) inferences while the left hemisphere is more sensitive to priming 
coherence (i.e. bridging/backward) inferences (Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000). 
Patients with right hemisphere damage have been shown to be less able to maintain 
predictive inferences over time than healthy individuals (Lehman-Blake & Tompkins, 
2001). Further, patients with right hemisphere brain damage have been found to display 
difficulty generating predictive inferences based on contextual details compared to 
individuals without brain damage (Lehman-Blake & Lesniewicz, 2005). For example, 
when presented with the sentence “The man threw the vase against the wall,” patients 
with right hemisphere damage are less likely than healthy participants to use the sentence 
context to activate the correct inference meaning (i.e., BREAK). fMRI studies have 
shown that while predictive inferences are constructed in the left inferior frontal gyrus, 
the right lingual gyrus is responsible for integrating predictive inferences into a reader’s 
representation of a text (Jin, Liu, Fang, Zhang, & Lin, 2009). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that the right hemisphere is involved in the processing of predictive 
inferences during reading.  
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Textual Constraint 
One factor that has been shown to influence the hemispheric processing of 
predictive inferences is textual constraint. Research has shown that the level of textual 
constraint—that is, how strongly text events point to a particular word or event—can 
affect activation in the cerebral hemispheres during inference generation (Virtue, van den 
Broek, & Linderholm, 2006a). Specifically, both hemispheres have been found to 
facilitate the process of generating strongly constrained inferences (Virtue et al., 2006). 
However, the right hemisphere has been found to display a distinct advantage for 
processing weakly constrained inferences (Virtue et al., 2006). For example, activation 
for the inference “kiss” is more likely to occur in the right hemisphere after reading the 
sentence “The students had just been announced as college graduates” than in the left 
hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum, while both hemispheres have been found to 
facilitate strongly constrained inferences, research suggests that the right hemisphere is 
uniquely involved in the processing of weakly constrained inferences.  
Beeman’s Fine Coarse Semantic Coding theory provides an explanation for 
patterns of hemispheric activity observed during inferential processing at varying levels 
of constraint (Beeman, Friedman, Grafman, Perez, Diamond, & Lindsay, 1994). This 
theory proposes that the left hemisphere—which contains more densely-packed neural 
structures than the right hemisphere—specializes in activating a limited set of strongly 
related associations (i.e., fine semantic coding) that are closely related to a given word 
during reading (Beeman et al., 1994). In contrast, the right hemisphere—which contains 
more loosely packed neural structures than the left hemisphere—specializes in the 
generation of broad, loosely correlated associations during reading (i.e., coarse coding) 
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(Beeman et al., 1994; Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000). For example, after being 
presented with the word “bee,” the left hemisphere would be more likely to generate 
closely-related semantic associations such as “honey” or “sting,” whereas the right 
hemisphere would be more likely to generate loosely related semantic associations such 
as “pollen” or “fly” (Beeman, Bowden, & Gernsbacher, 2000). Thus, the right 
hemisphere’s role in facilitating weakly constrained inferences is likely a product of its 
advantage for coarse coding of distantly related associations. As such, weakly 
constrained (i.e., coarsely associated) predictive inferences rely more on the looser neural 
connections of the right hemisphere than strongly constrained predictive inferences. 
Working Memory Capacity  
Along with textual constraint, another factor that has been found to influence the 
generation and hemispheric processing of predictive inferences is working memory 
capacity.  One of the most widely studied factors that influences inference generation 
during reading is working memory capacity (WMC) (i.e., the ability to store and 
manipulate multiple pieces of information at the same time) (Baddeley, 1983). Early 
research investigating the connection between inference processing and WMC found that 
individuals with high WMCs exhibited faster generation of bridging inferences and more 
efficient access to relevant knowledge than individuals with low WMCs (Singer & 
Ritchot, 1996). Researchers posited that the elevated inference and comprehension levels 
observed in high WMC readers were a result of a qualitatively different reading style that 
was better suited for efficiently integrating world knowledge and constructing situational 
models during reading (Dixon, LeFevre, & Twilley, 1988; Singer & Ritchot, 1996). In 
sum, differences in WMC have been found to explain much of the variance in readers’ 
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ability to successfully generate inferences during reading.  
Research has also investigated the mechanisms involved with these WMC-related 
differences in reading comprehension. Daneman & Carpenter (1983) found that 
individuals with low WMC have pronounced difficulties with integrating information 
(i.e., making connections between text events) and resolving lexical ambiguity (i.e., 
deciding on the appropriate interpretation of a word meaning when multiple 
interpretations are available) during reading. According to the Capacity Constrained 
Comprehension (CCC) theory, cognitively demanding reading tasks (e.g., reading a 
sentence that contains a complex structure or generating a predictive inference) require a 
certain amount of available cognitive resources in order to be successfully comprehended 
(Just & Carpenter, 1992).  With regard to predictive inferences, research has supported 
the CCC theory by showing that often only readers with high WMC possess enough 
available cognitive resources to activate inference-related concepts from LTM whereas 
low WMC readers do not (Linderholm, 2002). Thus, WMC can directly affect a reader’s 
ability to successfully generate predictive inferences during reading by influencing 
whether or not a reader has enough expendable cognitive resources available to activate 
the concepts necessary to generate a specific inference.   
Further research has investigated how inferential processing is manifested in the 
hemispheres of individuals with high and low WMC. Virtue, van den Broek, & 
Linderholm (2006) had participants read texts that promoted strongly or weakly 
constrained inferences and performed a lexical decision task (i.e., word/non-word 
judgment) in response to inference-related and neutral target words presented to either the 
right visual field-left hemisphere (RVF-LH) or the left visual field-right hemisphere 
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(LVF-RH). With regard to predictive inferences, their results indicated that readers with 
high WMC showed greater facilitation (i.e., response time to inference-related target 
words compared to neutral words) for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly 
constrained inferences in the both the left and right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006a). 
Conversely, low WMC readers exhibited an identical pattern in the left hemisphere but 
showed greater facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in the right hemisphere 
(Virtue et al., 2006). The researchers interpreted this hemispheric asymmetry as 
indicating a deficit in inhibiting the activation of less constrained and less contextually 
relevant potential outcomes on the part of low WMC readers (Virtue et al., 2006). In sum, 
research has shown that WMC influences reading comprehension and predictive 
inference generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint.  
Attentional Control 
Subsequent research has attempted to disentangle the mechanisms that underlie 
WMC and has suggested that one of its key components is attentional control (Unsworth 
& Spillers, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2012). The ability to keep one’s attention fixated on a 
task and resist interference from task-irrelevant stimuli has been found to reflect 
individual differences in WMC (Borella, Ludwig, Fagot, & De Ribaupierre, 2011; 
Levinson, Smallwood, & Davidson, 2012). According to the Executive-Attention view of 
WMC, the relation between WMC and reading comprehension is driven by overlapping, 
domain-general attentional-control mechanisms (Engle & Kane, 2004). That is, the 
attentional control mechanisms that are used for sustaining attention are thought to be the 
same regardless of the task or stimulus (Engle & Kane, 2004). The Executive-Attention 
view of WMC also posits that the act of paying attention during reading is governed by 
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the same attentional control mechanisms as those used in previous, non-lexically-based 
studies of attention and WMC. Thus, measuring an individual’s capacity to sustain their 
attention on simple stimuli (e.g., a number or a word) can provide valuable insight into 
their ability to pay attention during reading. 
The Executive-Attention view holds that there are two primary components that 
comprise WMC: goal maintenance and competition resolution (Engle & Kane, 2004; 
McVay & Kane, 2012). Goal maintenance guides attention toward task-relevant 
information and provides a mechanism for sustaining attention in the face of distractions 
(e.g., environmental interference, irrelevant thoughts, or mind wandering) (McVay & 
Kane, 2012). By contrast, competition resolution provides a mechanism for overcoming 
moment-by-moment interference from goal irrelevant stimuli (McVay & Kane, 2012). 
Researchers have contrasted these dual components of attention as being “proactive” 
versus “reactive” processes, respectively (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). That is, the 
proactive process of goal maintenance is initiated prior to task performance in order to 
maintain attention on a desired stimulus or action and minimize experiences of conflict 
from outside distractions (Braver et al., 2007). By contrast, the reactive process of 
competition resolution is initiated in the moment as a response to an attentional conflict 
(i.e., interference from habit, environmental distractors, or irrelevant thoughts) (Braver et 
al., 2007). Engle and Kane (2004) explained these two factors of executive control using 
results from an antisaccade task, a task in which participants are instructed to make a 
controlled eye movement in the opposite direction of a presented stimulus. Goal 
maintenance facilitates a participants’ ability to keep the task goal (i.e., to look away 
from the presented stimulus) in active memory whereas competition resolution resolves 
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the conflict between the current task goal and prepotent or habitual behaviors (i.e., the 
reflex to look at the presented stimulus) (Engle & Kane, 2004).  While reading a text, 
goal maintenance is the process that allows a reader to maintain their focus on 
comprehending the content they are reading whereas competition resolution allows a 
reader resolve attentional conflicts and prevent activation of irrelevant information. In 
this way, goal maintenance is the mechanism for directing and sustaining attention on a 
task. Competition resolution, on the other hand, is the mechanism by which distractions 
and irrelevant information is inhibited.   
Research on attentional control during text comprehension has suggested that 
attentional control primarily contributes to the goal maintenance component of WMC as 
it allows readers to sustain attention during text comprehension (McVay & Kane, 2012). 
Using the antisaccade task, research by Engle & Kane (2004) showed that participants 
with high WMC were better able to direct their attention away from a presented stimulus 
than participants with low WMC. Further research by Molenberghs, Gillebert, Schoofs, 
Dupont, Peeters, and Vandenberghe (2009) found that commission errors (i.e., errors in a 
go/no-go paradigm associated with incorrectly responding to a no-go trial) were 
associated with fluctuations in sustained attention. Research has postulated that 
commission errors may arise from a switch to automatic processing, which affects goal 
maintenance in such a way that subjects are not able to inhibit a pre-potent go response in 
a no-go trial. In this way, goal maintenance is the primary component associated with 
attentional control (McVay & Kane, 2012). Thus, while competition resolution (e.g., 
suppressing inappropriate word meanings) may play a role in the relation between WMC 
and reading comprehension, research suggests that attentional control is more heavily 
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reliant on goal maintenance processes (Gernsbacher, 1993; Gernsbacher & Robertson, 
1995; McVay & Kane, 2012). For example, research shows that readers who are lower in 
attentional control are more prone to activating task-irrelevant representations in LTM 
and mind wandering during reading than readers who with higher attentional control, 
which negatively affects comprehension by drawing attention away from the goal of 
understanding a text (Unworth et al., 2009; McVay & Kane, 2012). Further, inefficient 
goal maintenance processes can affect situation model construction and inference 
generation by initiating less-constrained searches of LTM during reading which, in turn, 
can create interference with task-relevant thoughts (McVay & Kane, 2012). Thus, 
attentional control could play a crucial role in facilitating readers’ ability to activate 
predictive inferences during reading by promoting the goal maintenance processes that 
allow readers to activate inference-related concepts in LTM while filtering out task-
irrelevant thoughts.  
To summarize, research has indicated that despite being helpful for 
comprehension, predictive inferences are cognitively demanding and are not routinely 
generated by all readers during text comprehension. Research has also suggested that the 
right hemisphere is involved in facilitating predictive inferences and that hemispheric 
activation of predictive inferences during reading varies as a function of textual 
constraint. Further research has indicated that readers with high versus low WMC are 
better able to activate predictive inferences during reading and that these differences are 
reflected in differing patterns of hemispheric activation during predictive inference 
generation. Research has also shown that levels of textual constraint can influence 
patterns of inference generation in readers with high versus low WMC. Finally, 
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attentional control has been identified as a crucial component of WMC that facilitates 
goal maintenance processes during reading. Taken as a whole, these research findings 
suggest that attentional control could play an important role in predictive inference 
generation and that this role could provide a clearer picture of the processes that underlie 
WMC-related variation in predictive inference generation in the hemispheres as a 
function of textual constraint.   
Rationale 
 
 Previous research has established that individual differences in WMC can 
successfully predict variance in predictive inference generation during reading.  Research 
has also indicated that variance in the ability to generate predictive inferences is 
manifested in the hemispheres and can be measured by varying the degree of textual 
constraint in inference-related texts. Research supports the view that attentional control is 
a crucial component of WMC that facilitates goal maintenance processes during reading. 
However, the specific contribution of attentional control to predictive inference 
generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint has not been 
investigated. Investigating this potential link could provide valuable information about 
how an individual’s ability to sustain their attention during reading can affect their ability 
to successfully predict what will happen next in a text. Thus, the present study 
investigates the extent to which attentional control affects the speed and accuracy of 
predictive inference generation in the hemispheres during reading and how this effect 
varies as a function of textual constraint. 
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Statement of Hypotheses 
 
It is hypothesized that strongly constrained predictive inferences will be processed 
faster than weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. With regard to attentional 
control, it is predicted that a three-way interaction will occur; with higher levels of right 
hemisphere facilitation occurring for weakly constrained predictive inferences in the low 
attentional control condition than in the high attentional control condition. 
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METHOD 
 
Research Participants 
 
 78 undergraduate students (59 female, 19 male) at DePaul University participated 
in the experiment in exchange for course credit. All participants were native speakers of 
American English with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants were right-
handed, as indicated by a score of 0.30 or greater on the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory (mean laterality quotient = .84) (Oldfield, 1971). 
Materials 
 
Semantic Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART) 
 Before the inference task, participants were asked to complete the Semantic 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART), taken directly from McVay and Kane 
(2009). The Semantic SART is a go/no-go task in which subjects respond quickly with a 
key press to all presented stimuli except infrequent (11%) targets. This version presents 
words—other versions of the SART have used digits—for 300 ms followed by a 900 ms 
mask. Most of the stimuli (non-target go trials) belonged to one category (e.g., animals) 
while infrequent no-go targets belonged to another category (e.g., foods). Participants 
were instructed to indicate, as quickly and accurately as possible (via a button press), 
each time they saw a word that fit into the category of “animal” (e.g., giraffe) appear on 
the screen but NOT when they saw a word that fit into the category of “food” (e.g., 
apple). After some of the target trials, participants had to complete a thought probe. This 
short questionnaire asked them to indicate which item from a list of options best 
described what they were just thinking about (e.g., “daydreaming”). The present study 
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utilized a 20-minute version of the Semantic SART containing 540 trials, 60 targets, and 
36 thought probes, which occurred after 60% of targets.  
 Semantic SART performance was measured based on response time variability. 
Response time variability (RT variability) was calculated by taking the standard deviation 
of a participant’s non-target, “go” trials (Jensen, 1992; McVay & Kane 2009, 2012). RT 
variability has been shown to reflect attentional fluctuations over the course of the 
Semantic SART task and has been correlated with WMC variation, frontal cortex 
function, deficits in sustained attention, and rates of mind wandering (Bellgrove, Hester, 
& Garavan, 2004; Johnson, Kelly, Bellgrove, Barry, Cox, Gill, & Robertson, 2007; 
McVay & Kane, 2009). Unlike go/no-go accuracy scores, which can be subject to floor 
and ceiling effects (e.g., near-ceiling accuracy on non-target “go” trials and/or less than 
chance accuracy on “no-go” target trials), RT variability provides a simple and reliable 
measure of a participant’s ability to sustain their attention on a task over time (McVay & 
Kane, 2012). As it relates to goal maintenance—which research suggests is the primary 
process by which attentional control contributes to WMC—RT variability provides a 
measure of a reader’s ability to continually maintain the goal of the task (i.e., pressing the 
space bar for non-target stimuli but not for target stimuli) while resisting interference 
from task unrelated thoughts and environmental distractions. To distinguish low and high 
attentional control readers, a median split was performed. After performing a median split 
on participants’ Semantic SART RT variability scores, 39 participants were identified as 
low attentional control readers (M = 155.54, SD = 42.15) and 39 participants were 
identified as high attentional control readers (M = 91.48, SD = 17.32).  
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Texts 
 The materials for the inference task consisted of three sets of 48 texts (inference, 
neutral, and filler), taken from texts used in Virtue, van den Broek, and Linderholm 
(2006). Texts consisted of four sentences, the last of which promoted a predictive 
inference. For each constraint condition, the final sentence of the text was designed to 
promote either a strongly or weakly constrained a predictive inference regarding the 
scenario described in the previous three sentences. In the neutral and filler conditions, the 
final sentence contained information that was designed not to promote a predictive 
inference about the preceding sentences. Examples of predictive inference texts are 
featured in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Example Predictive Inference Text (Taken from Virtue, van den Broek, and 
Linderholm, 2006) 
Inference Text 
Tom and Krista were standing together holding hands. 
Both of them were a little nervous, but mostly excited about today. 
Tom imagined the future as he looked at Krista. 
Strong textual constraint: They were just pronounced as man and wife. 
Weak textual constraint: They were just announced as college graduates. 
Target word: kiss 
Neutral Text 
The three women had been friends since childhood. 
No matter where they were, they stayed in touch. 
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Currently, they were together to celebrate New Year’s Eve. 
They spent the evening discussing old memories and talking about the future 
Target word: kiss 
 
Target Words 
Each of the inference and neutral texts were followed by a target word that 
corresponded with the inference invoked by the sentence. For example, in the text in 
Table 1, the first three sentences of the passage provide the context for the reader to infer 
that Tom and Krista will kiss. The fourth sentence in the passage was either strongly or 
weakly related to target word (i.e., kiss). Neutral texts were paired with target words, but 
the neutral texts did not promote the targeted inference. For example, the neutral text in 
Table 1 should not cause a reader to activate the target word (i.e., kiss), as it does not fit 
the context of the preceding sentences. Therefore, the neutral texts provided a baseline 
for reaction times in each hemisphere. Target words in the present study were one or two 
syllable action verbs and were similar in number of letters and frequency across 
conditions. The filler texts did not promote these intended inferences and were paired 
with non-word targets to keep participants from developing a positive response bias 
(Neely, Keefe, & Ross, 1989). Data from the filler texts were excluded from the analyses 
because it is extremely unlikely that a reader would activate a non-word in response to a 
text.  
 
Procedure 
 
For the inference task, participants were asked to place their head in a chin rest 
positioned 50 cm from a computer screen. This was done to ensure that each participant 
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maintained a consistent distance and visual angle from the central fixation point for the 
entirety of the experiment.  
Participants were presented with an equal number of texts from the inference 
(weakly and strongly constrained), neutral, and filler conditions on a PC using E-Prime 
software (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). The order and type of inference 
texts were randomized using six between-subject counterbalancing conditions. 
Participants only saw each text once in each version of the experiment. Participants read 
each sentence at their own pace, one sentence at a time, as they appear on the computer 
screen. Participants proceeded from one sentence to another using via a button press. 
After reading the fourth and final sentence of each text, participants were instructed to 
fixate on the center of a fixation plus (+) for the entire time (750 ms) that it appeared on 
the computer screen.  
Participants were then asked to perform a lexical decision task, during which they 
had to decide (via button press), as quickly and as accurately as possible, whether a string 
of letters (e.g., kiss) presented to either their right or left visual field for 176ms was a 
word or a non-word. Targets words were presented approximately 3.5° to the left or right 
of the fixation point at the center of the computer screen. Each participant was presented 
with 144 texts (48 inference texts, 48 neutral texts, and 48 filler texts).  
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RESULTS  
 
 Response time latencies and accuracy for the target words were analyzed. Only 
correct responses were included in the analyses. To control for outlier effects, the top and 
bottom 1% of response times were not included in the analyses. F1 refers to by-subject 
analyses and F2 refers to by-item analyses.  
Inference-Related Response Time Facilitation Effects 
 To test the first hypothesis that strongly constrained inferences would be 
processed faster than weakly constrained inferences, a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted on facilitation scores for mean inference response times in the strongly and 
weakly constrained conditions in each visual field-hemisphere. Facilitation scores were 
calculated by subtracting the inference condition response times from the neutral 
condition response times in each visual field—hemisphere. The independent variables 
were textual constraint (weak or strong) and visual field-hemisphere (right visual field—
left hemisphere or right visual field—left hemisphere). By participant analyses showed 
no significant effect of sex, response hand, and counterbalancing condition, so these are 
not reported.  
 Mean inference facilitation by constraint and visual field—hemisphere is 
presented in Figure 1 (refer to Table 2 for mean response times by condition). There was 
no main effect of visual field—hemisphere, F1 (1, 76) = 0.01, MSe = 115.25, p = .913; F2 
(1, 47) = 0.02, MSe = 268.41, p = .88. There was a main effect of textual constraint, F1 (1, 
76) = 26.95, MSe = 71,788.78, p < .05; F2 (1, 47) = 13.32, MSe = 53136.29, p < .05. 
Results indicated greater facilitation for strongly constrained texts (M = 37.88, SE = 
10.19) than for weakly constrained texts (M = 7.544, SE = 10.97).  
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Two-tailed paired sample t-tests were conducted to test whether or not facilitation 
scores differed significantly by condition in each visual field—hemisphere.  In the rvf-
LH, strongly constrained texts showed greater facilitation than weakly constrained texts, 
t1 (77) = -3.72, SE = 9.65, p < .05; t2 (47) = -2.77, SE = 14.71, p < .05. In the lvf-RH, 
strongly constrained texts also showed greater facilitation than weakly constrained texts, 
t1 (77) = -3.00, SE = 8.31, p < .05; t2 (47) = -2.25, SE = 11.47, p < .05. There was no 
significant difference between strongly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH and lvf-RH, 
t1 (77) = 0.33, SE = 12.75, p = 0.75; t2 (47) = 0.28, SE = 18.12, p = 0.78 and there was no 
significant difference between weakly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH and lvf-RH, t1 
(77) = -0.49, SE = 13.38, p = 0.62; t2 (47) = -0.52, SE = 19.06, p = 0.61. Thus, greater 
facilitation was evident for strongly constrained than for weakly constrained inferences in 
both hemispheres. 
One sample t-tests were conducted to test whether or not facilitation differed 
significantly from zero by condition in each visual field—hemisphere.  Facilitation was 
significantly greater than zero for strongly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH, t1 (77) = 
3.99, SE = 10.01, p < .05; t2 (47) = 2.35, SE = 16.54, p < .05 as well as in the lvf-RH, t1 
(77) = 3.45, SE = 10.37, p < .05; t2 (47) = 2.48, SE = 13.66, p < .05. Facilitation was not 
significantly greater than zero for weakly constrained inferences in the rvf-LH, t1 (77) = 
0.33, SE = 12.82, p = 0.74; t2 (47) = -0.13, SE = 14.43, p = 0.90 nor in the lvf-RH, t1 (77) 
= 1.19, SE = 9.11, p = 0.24; t2 (47) = 0.55, SE = 14.53, p = 0.58. Thus, only responses in 
the strongly constrained inference condition showed facilitation that differed significantly 
from zero. 
Running Head: PREDICTIVE INFERENCES AND ATTENTIONAL CONTROL 32 
 
Figure 1. Average facilitation for strongly and weakly constrained predictive inference 
by visual field—hemisphere. rvf-LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf-RH = left 
visual field—right hemisphere. 
Table 2. Mean Response Times (in ms) and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and 
Neutral Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere.  
 rvf-LH lvf-RH 
Condition M SE M SE 
Strong Textual Constraint 397 14.87 412 15.10 
Weak Textual Constraint 432 18.09 437 15.10 
Neutral Textual Constraint 437 14.12 448 14.16 
Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—
right hemisphere. 
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Accuracy 
 To test for accuracy effects by condition (see Table 3 for mean accuracy 
percentages by condition), a 3 (Textual Constraint: Strong, Weak, or Neutral) × 2 (Visual 
Field—Hemisphere: rvf—LH or lvf—RH) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted. 
There was no main effect of visual field—hemisphere, F1 (1, 77) = 0.01, MSe = .01, p = 
.50; F2 (1, 47) = 0.31, MSe = .01, p = 0.58. There was a main effect of textual constraint, 
F1 (1, 76) = 12.77, MSe = 0.16, p < .05; F2 (1, 47) = 5.88, MSe = 0.09, p < .05. There was 
not a significant interaction between visual field—hemisphere and textual constraint F1 
(1, 76) = 1.70, MSe = 0.01, p = 0.19; F2 (1, 47) = 0.63, MSe = 0.01, p = 0.54. Results 
indicated higher accuracy for both strongly constrained texts and weakly constrained 
texts than for neutral texts. 
Table 3. Mean Accuracy Percentages and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and Neutral 
Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere.  
 rvf-LH lvf-RH 
Condition M SE M SE 
Strong Textual Constraint 94 0.01 96 0.01 
Weak Textual Constraint 93 0.01 94 0.01 
Neutral Textual Constraint 90 0.02 88 0.02 
Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—
right hemisphere. 
 
Attentional Control Effects on Inference-Related Response Time Facilitation 
 To test the second hypothesis that attentional control would display a three-way 
interaction along with textual constraint and visual field—hemisphere, a 2 (Attentional 
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Control: High or Low) × 2 (Textual Constraint: Strong or Weak) × 2 (Visual Field—
Hemisphere: rvf—LH or lvf—RH) mixed factors ANOVA was conducted (see Table 2 
for mean response times by inference condition). Results indicated no significant three 
way interaction between attentional control, textual constraint, and visual field—
hemisphere, F (1, 76) = 1.23, MSe = 4542.19, p = 0.27. However, follow-up contrasts 
revealed that while the same pattern of significantly greater facilitation for strongly 
constrained inferences than weakly constrained inferences in both visual field—
hemispheres was evident in the high attentional control group (see Figure 3, right panel) 
for both the rvf-LH, t (38) = -2.34, SE = 11.22, p < .05 and the lvf-RH, t (38) = -3.36, SE 
= 9.17, p < .05, in the low attentional control group (see Figure 3, left panel), facilitation 
was only significantly greater for strongly constrained inferences than weakly constrained 
inferences in the rvf-LH,  t (38) = -2.87, SE = 15.71, p < .05 and not in the lvf-RH, t (38) 
= -1.37, SE = 13.93, p = .18. Thus, facilitation for strongly constrained inferences was 
greater than facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in both visual field—
hemispheres in the high attentional control group but this pattern was only evident in the 
rvf-LH in the low attentional control group. One sample t-tests indicated that facilitation 
for strongly constrained inferences in the high attentional control group (see Figure 3, 
right panel) was significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 4.79, SE = 11.51, p 
< .05 and in the lvf-RH, t (38) = 4.44, SE = 10.82, p < .05. Facilitation for weakly 
constrained inferences in the high attentional control group was significantly greater than 
zero for in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 2.30, SE = 12.55, p < .05 but not in the lvf-RH, t (38) = 
1.44, SE = 11.92, p = 0.16. In the low attentional control group, facilitation for strongly 
constrained inferences was not significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = 1.53, 
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SE = 16.17, p = 0.13 or in the lvf-RH, t (38) = 1.34, SE = 17.64, p = 0.19. Facilitation for 
weakly constrained inferences in the low attentional control group was also not 
significantly greater than zero in the rvf-LH, t (38) = -0.93, SE = 21.84, p = 0.36 or in the 
lvf-RH, t (38) = 0.324, SE = 13.87, p = 0.75. Thus, the high attentional control group 
showed significant facilitation for inferences in all conditions except for weakly 
constrained inferences in the lvf-RH whereas the low attentional group did not show 
significant facilitation for any of the conditions. 
 
Figure 2. Average facilitation for strongly and weakly constrained predictive inferences 
by visual field—hemisphere and attentional control. Facilitation for low attentional 
control readers is shown on the left and facilitation for high attentional control readers is 
shown on the right. rvf-LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf-RH = left visual 
field—right hemisphere. 
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Table 4. Mean Response Times (in ms) and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and 
Neutral Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere for 
Low and High Attentional Control Groups. 
 Attentional Control 
 Low High 
Condition M SE M SE 
Strong Textual Constraint 
rvf-LH 413.33 24.59 380.85 16.67 
lvf-RH 429.51 24.92 395.42 18.99 
Weak Textual Constraint     
rvf-LH 458.47 29.90 407.15 19.93 
lvf-RH 448.62 23.10 426.22 19.58 
Neutral Textual Constraint     
rvf-LH 438.08 20.13 436.03 20.08 
lvf-RH 453.12 22.82 443.41 17.05 
Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—right hemisphere. 
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Table 5. Mean Accuracy Percentages and Standard Errors for Strong, Weak, and Neutral 
Textual Constraint Predictive Inference Texts by Visual Field—Hemisphere for Low and 
High Attentional Control Groups. 
 Attentional Control 
 Low High 
Condition M SE M SE 
Strong Textual Constraint 
rvf-LH 94 0.01 93 0.01 
lvf-RH 96 0.01 95 0.02 
Weak Textual Constraint     
rvf-LH 95 0.02 91 0.02 
lvf-RH 94 0.02 95 0.02 
Neutral Textual Constraint     
rvf-LH 90 0.03 91 0.02 
lvf-RH 88 0.03 87 0.02 
Note: rvf—LH = right visual field—left hemisphere, lvf—RH = left visual field—right hemisphere. 
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DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from this study show the effects of attentional control on predictive 
inference generation in the hemispheres as a function of textual constraint. These findings 
support the hypothesis that facilitation for strongly constrained inferences was greater 
than for weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. This demonstrates the effect 
of textual constraint on predictive inference generation in the hemispheres and is 
consistent with findings from previous studies (Linderholm, 2002; Virtue et al., 2006). 
Specifically, this pattern of results suggests that both cerebral hemispheres respond faster 
to inference-related target words when they are preceded by passages that are strongly 
related to the target word than passages that are weakly related to the target word.  
 The finding that, overall, only strongly constrained inferences showed significant 
facilitation for inference-related targets in both hemispheres further supports the initial 
hypothesis that strongly constrained inferences would show greater facilitation than 
weakly constrained inferences in both hemispheres. However, these findings do not 
replicate the results of Virtue et al. (2006) with regard to weakly constrained inferences. 
Virtue and colleagues (2006) found significantly greater facilitation for weakly 
constrained predictive inferences in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere. 
These results did not indicate a significant processing advantage for predictive inferences 
in the right hemisphere compared to the left hemisphere, nor did they show significant 
facilitation for weakly constrained predictive inferences in either hemisphere. Further, the 
observation of this pattern in both hemispheres does not support predictions based on the 
Fine-Coarse Semantic Coding Theory that weakly constrained predictive inferences—
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which contained target words that were distantly related to the preceding passages—
would show greater activation in the right hemisphere than in the left hemisphere. 
 One potential explanation for this pattern of results is that the Semantic SART 
task was administered before the inference task rather than afterward. By contrast, Virtue 
et al. (2006) administered the R-Span working memory task after the inference task. This 
may have had an effect on the patterns of hemispheric activation observed during the 
inference task in this study. Previous studies have shown that the right-lateralized fronto-
parietal attentional network is less active after performing a psychomotor vigilance task 
(PVT) than before the task (Lim, Wu, Wang, Detre, Dinges, & Rao, 2010). Further, 
research has also suggested that the cerebral blood flow velocity (CBFV) in both the right 
and left hemispheres can decline over time as participants perform a sustained attention 
task (Shaw, Finomore, Warm, & Matthews, 2012). In this way, it is possible that 
participants’ activation patterns were affected by fatigue due to sustained attention in the 
Semantic SART task. Specifically with regard to low attentional control readers, it is 
possible that attentional fatigue after performing the Semantic SART task could have led 
to difficulties in performing the cognitively demanding task of predictive inference 
generation and, consequently, less facilitation than might have been observed if the 
inference task had been performed before the Semantic SART task. By contrast, the high 
attentional control readers my have been more resistant to the effects of attentional 
fatigue and, thus, may have had less difficulty in generating predictive inferences after 
performing the Semantic SART task than low attentional control readers. This would 
explain why, despite showing several similarities to the pattern of results observed in 
Virtue et al. (2006) (i.e., greater facilitation for strongly than weakly constrained 
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inferences, similar facilitation for strongly constrained inferences in the LH and RH, and 
greater—albeit non-significant—facilitation for weakly constrained inferences in the RH 
than in the LH) the results of this study were not more closely aligned with the results 
from Virtue et al. (2006) and predictions made based on the Fine-Coarse Semantic 
Coding Theory.  
 Another potential explanation for this difference can be found in the contrast 
between the facilitation results for the high attentional control group versus the low 
attentional control group. The high attentional control group showed significantly greater 
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly constrained inferences in 
both hemispheres. Further, the high attentional control group showed significant 
facilitation for all conditions except for weakly constrained inferences in the right 
hemisphere. This suggests that readers with high attentional control activate word 
meanings related to strongly constrained predictive inferences in both hemispheres, but 
that they only activate meanings related to weakly constrained inferences in the left 
hemisphere.  
 By contrast, readers with low attentional control only showed significantly greater 
facilitation for strongly constrained inferences than for weakly constrained inferences in 
the left hemisphere. Further, low attentional control readers did not show significant 
facilitation for strongly or weakly constrained inferences in either hemisphere. These 
results did not confirm the hypothesis that low attentional control readers would display 
higher facilitation for weakly constrained inferences than high attentional control readers. 
However, consistent with the Capacity Constrained Comprehension (CCC) theory, these 
results suggest that readers with low attentional control do not possess enough available 
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cognitive resources to facilitate either strongly or weakly constrained predictive 
inferences (Just & Carpenter, 1992). These results also support the Minimalist 
Hypothesis in that not all readers in this study appeared to routinely generate predictive 
inferences during reading (McKoon & Ratcliff, 1992). However, the specific distinction 
between attentional control and WMC as evidenced by the differences between the 
results of this study and the results of Virtue et al. (2006) and other theories of 
hemispheric inference processing (e.g., the Fine-Coarse Coding theory) is difficult to 
determine solely based on these results. However, the Executive Attention view of WMC 
does offer a potential explanation.    
 The Executive Attention view states that working memory capacity is comprised 
of two primary mechanisms: goal maintenance (i.e., the ability to sustain attention on a 
specific task or stimulus) and competition resolution (i.e., the ability to overcome 
moment-by-moment interference from goal-irrelevant stimuli). Previous research has 
suggested that attentional control is primarily associated with the goal maintenance 
component of working memory (McVay & Kane, 2012). This is consistent with the 
finding that high attentional control readers show greater facilitation for strongly 
constrained (i.e., more likely) predictive inferences than for weakly constrained (i.e., less 
likely) predictive inferences because strongly constrained inferences are more closely 
related to the goal of comprehending a text (i.e., they are more immediately relevant to 
the context of the sentence) than weakly constrained inferences. Further, the finding that 
only high attentional control readers showed significant facilitation for weakly 
constrained inferences suggests that, consistent with the Executive Attention view and 
CCC theory, only readers with high attentional control had enough cognitive resources 
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available to generate weakly constrained predictive inferences. By contrast, the readers 
with low attentional control may not have had enough available resources to maintain the 
goal of comprehension while reading the texts to generate strongly or weakly constrained 
inferences about information in the texts. Thus, the difference between these findings and 
the findings of Virtue et al. (2006) could be that while the low WMC readers from their 
study were more likely to activate less likely (i.e., weakly constrained) inferences in the 
right hemispheres, low attentional control readers did not possess enough available 
resources generate any predictive inferences.  
   These findings suggest that readers with high attentional control are more likely 
to generate predictive inferences during text comprehension than readers with low 
attentional control. These results also highlight a distinction between predictive inference 
generation in low working memory capacity readers versus low attentional control 
readers in that low working memory capacity readers show right hemisphere facilitation 
for weakly constrained inferences whereas low attention control readers do not (Virtue et 
al., 2006). Predictive inference generation is a cognitively demanding task that requires 
available working memory resources to generate predictions about what will happen next 
in a text (Linderholm, 2002). Since predictive inferences contribute to reading 
comprehension by promoting anticipation of future text events, causal connections 
between text events, and improved situation model construction, these findings suggest 
that readers with high attentional control may be better comprehenders than readers with 
low attentional control (van den Broek, 1990; Fincher-Kiefer, 1993). These findings 
differ from those of previous studies in that low attentional control readers appear to have 
difficulty generating predictive inferences regardless of the level of constraint whereas 
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previous studies have suggested that low WMC readers activate strongly constrained 
inferences in both hemispheres and activate weakly constrained predictive inferences in 
the right hemisphere (Virtue et al., 2006). This finding may suggest that attentional 
control is an essential factor in the process of predictive inference generation. Future 
studies should further examine the specific mechanisms that contribute to the differences 
between low attentional control and low WMC readers. In sum, this study improves our 
understanding of text comprehension by showing how attentional control contributes to 
predictive inference generation during reading, how textual constraint can influence 
predictive inference generation in readers with high versus low attentional control, how 
attentional control contributes to working memory processes during predictive inference 
generation, and how these processes are activated in the cerebral hemispheres during text 
comprehension.    
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